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Certificates and PKI for vehicles

Certificates let vehicles verify who holds a public key, while a public key infrastructure manages that trust across production, service, charging and connected services.

6 min read · Discipline stake: Security BSW Diagnostics Architecture

Why it exists

A vehicle receives connections from backend services, workshop testers and charging equipment. Before granting access, it needs to establish who is communicating with it. A public key alone does not answer that question: an attacker can generate a key pair too.

A certificate binds a public key to an identity or an authorized role. A trusted issuer signs that binding. The vehicle can then verify credentials without storing a separate secret for every backend or workshop tester.

The surrounding public key infrastructure (PKI) makes this workable across a fleet. It manages issuance, trust distribution, renewal and withdrawal of credentials.

What it is

An X.509 certificate is a signed data structure. The Internet profile is defined in IETF RFC 5280. Its important contents include:

Content Meaning
Subject and alternative names Identify the entity associated with the key; the relevant identity field depends on the application.
Public key Lets a verifier check signatures or establish a secure connection using the matching private key.
Issuer and issuer signature Identify the issuing authority and protect the certificate contents against alteration.
Validity The notBefore and notAfter timestamps define the certificate’s validity interval.
Extensions Restrict uses, identify permitted roles and indicate whether the holder may issue certificates.

The certificate is normally public. Its matching private key must remain secret. Presenting a certificate is insufficient: the holder must also prove possession of that private key, usually by signing a fresh challenge or handshake.

A certificate authority (CA) issues certificates. A root CA commonly has a self-signed certificate, installed through a trusted process. Its self-signature does not create trust; local configuration does.

An intermediate CA receives authority from another CA and issues certificates within defined limits. This lets an organization protect its root key while using intermediate keys for routine issuance.

How it works

A verifier builds a chain from the presented certificate through intermediate CAs to a configured trust anchor, usually a root CA.

Example: an ECU certificate chain
OEM root CAInstalled as a trusted anchor
Production intermediate CAAuthorized by the root to issue device certificates
ECU certificateBinds the ECU identity to its public key

The verifier checks signatures and constraints back to its own configured trust anchor.

It checks signatures, validity, issuer constraints, permitted key usage and the expected identity. It also applies the application’s revocation and authorization policy. A valid chain establishes a trusted binding; it does not automatically grant every operation.

Different vehicle uses

Backend and OEM PKI. An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) can operate a private PKI for vehicle identities and internal services. Internet-facing backend services may use a separate trust model. Transport Layer Security (TLS) uses certificates to authenticate peers and establish protected channels. Trust stores should reflect which services each vehicle component actually needs.

Production provisioning. An electronic control unit (ECU) receives a device certificate, its chain and required trust anchors during controlled production provisioning. Prefer generating its private key inside protected device storage where supported. The production system verifies the public key and device identity before issuance. Replacement ECUs need an equally controlled enrollment process.

Diagnostic testers. Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) Authentication, service 0x29, supports certificate-based authentication under ISO 14229-1; AUTOSAR’s Specification of Diagnostics also describes this service. The ECU verifies the tester’s credentials and proof of private-key possession. A separate authorization policy determines which routines, data or programming operations that tester may access.

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X). IEEE 1609.2 defines specialized vehicular security credentials rather than X.509 certificates. V2X deployments use short-lived pseudonym certificates to authenticate messages while reducing exposure of a persistent vehicle identity. Changing certificates alone does not prevent tracking through message content or radio observations.

Plug & Charge. ISO 15118 charging uses PKI to support automatic authentication. Charging-station credentials help the vehicle authenticate charging infrastructure. Contract certificates support charging-contract authentication. Production provisioning credentials, contract credentials and station credentials have different roles and lifecycle owners.

Validation inside an ECU

Certificate timestamps require trustworthy time. An ECU may boot without a reliable clock, especially after power loss. Define how it obtains authenticated time, preserves a trusted lower bound and resists clock rollback. An unauthenticated time message must not make an expired certificate acceptable.

Revocation addresses credentials withdrawn before expiry. A certificate revocation list (CRL) distributes signed revocation information. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) obtains signed status responses from a responder. Both need freshness checks, and online access may be unavailable.

Short-lived certificates reduce the period during which a stolen credential remains useful, but increase renewal dependence. They still require trustworthy time and a recovery path. Define behavior for stale status information explicitly; silently accepting it defeats the policy.

Tester certificate issuance and validation
Root CA
Intermediate CA
TesterDevice certificate holder
ECURoot already trusted
Signed CA certificateRoot signs intermediate's certificate
Signed device certificateIntermediate signs tester's certificate
Certificate and intermediate
Validate certificate chainCheck signatures and constraints to trusted root

Example issuance and presentation flow; the ECU also checks validity, identity and applicable policy, and authentication requires separate proof of private-key possession.

When to use it — and when not

Use certificates when independently managed participants need scalable authentication: vehicles connecting to backends, workshop access, charging contracts and signed V2X messages.

They also help separate trust domains. A workshop credential should not become a backend server credential simply because both chain to a familiar authority.

Certificates are usually unsuitable as overhead on every periodic control message. Authenticate participants or establish keys first, then use an appropriate lightweight message-protection mechanism. A closed system with securely provisioned symmetric keys may not need a PKI at all.

Best practices

  • Design for the vehicle’s service life. For a vehicle expected to remain in service for fifteen years, plan successive credentials, trust-anchor updates and algorithm migration. This is a design scenario, not a recommended certificate lifetime.
  • Rotate before expiry. Renew with margin for parked vehicles, unavailable networks and interrupted updates. Test the new credential before retiring the old one.
  • Treat CA rotation separately. Distribute new trust anchors through an authenticated mechanism while an existing recovery route still works. Coordinate overlap with backend and workshop systems.
  • Separate roles and keys. Give production, diagnostics, charging and backend credentials narrowly defined purposes. Protect private keys and restrict which software can request their use.
  • Bound validation work. Limit certificate sizes and chain depth, reject unsupported algorithms and use a maintained parser. Test malformed chains and resource exhaustion.
  • Exercise recovery. Cover expired credentials, lost time, revoked testers, replaced ECUs and compromised issuing authorities in service procedures.

Common pitfalls

  • Accepting any certificate from a trusted CA without checking the expected identity, role and permitted use.
  • Treating a certificate as proof that the presenter holds its private key.
  • Disabling validity checks because the ECU lacks trusted time.
  • Requiring fresh online revocation status without a workable disconnected-service policy.
  • Issuing a vehicle-life certificate to avoid building renewal, leaving compromise and algorithm changes unresolved.
  • Renewing the certificate after key theft while keeping the compromised private key.
  • Assuming backend, diagnostic, V2X and charging credentials share one format, trust store or authorization policy.

What it means for your discipline

  • Cybersecurity Core

    Defines certificate profiles, trust anchors, issuance rules and revocation policy; plans recovery when a device key or issuing authority is compromised.

  • Base software Partial

    Integrates certificate parsing, signature verification, protected key storage and trusted time; handles validation failures within ECU memory and runtime limits.

  • Diagnostics & lifecycle Partial

    Maps authenticated tester identities to diagnostic permissions and verifies workshop access, offline servicing and replacement-ECU workflows.

  • E/E architecture Partial

    Assigns trust boundaries between vehicle, backend, workshop and charging systems; defines how credentials reach disconnected vehicles throughout service life.

No direct stake: Functional safety · HPC & application software · Hardware & silicon · Networks & communication · Software update & OTA

Where it sits in the software stack

Generic layered software of a central HPC (application processor with hypervisor, plus a safety island) and of a classic MCU-based ECU (AUTOSAR Classic). Highlighted modules matter for this topic. Click any module to open its page.

HPC · application processor (MPU) and safety island (MCU)
  • Security services — Validates certificate chains, identities, validity and revocation status against configured trust anchors.
  • Diagnostics — Uses authenticated tester identities to enforce diagnostic access permissions.
MCU-based ECU · AUTOSAR Classic
  • Memory · crypto · WdgM — Provides cryptographic verification and persistent storage for certificates, trust anchors and revocation state.
  • Diagnostics — Implements UDS Authentication and maps authenticated tester identities to permitted diagnostic operations.
  • Microcontroller · HSM — Protects device private keys and performs supported cryptographic operations inside the HSM.