Contents
SpecificationAUTOSAR

AUTOSAR SecOC & crypto stack

Secure onboard communication, cryptographic services, and secure hardware extensions

AUTOSAR’s secure-communication and crypto specifications define how ECUs authenticate onboard messages and call standard cryptographic services, including keys kept in secure hardware.

What it is

AUTOSAR separates vehicle cryptography into a service stack and a communication module that uses it. On the Classic Platform, software asks the Crypto Service Manager (Csm) for a job such as a message authentication code, a hash, encryption, or use of a stored key. The Crypto Interface forwards that job to a Crypto Driver, which talks to a software library or a hardware security module. Callers stay the same when the silicon changes.

Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) uses those jobs on selected protocol data units. The sender adds a freshness value and an authenticator, commonly a MAC over the payload and the freshness. The receiver accepts the payload only when its own check matches. Freshness stops a frame recorded on the bus from being accepted later as a new command.

On the Adaptive Platform, ara::crypto provides cryptographic providers and key storage in place of the Classic Csm, Crypto Interface, and Crypto Driver layering. Many microcontrollers implement a SHE-style secure element: protected key slots, authenticated key updates, and a MAC over boot memory. Classic crypto drivers are where that hardware shows up as AUTOSAR jobs.

Who it applies to

Any ECU that authenticates onboard traffic or stores keys is in scope. That covers body, chassis, and powertrain controllers, MCU-based zone controllers, and Adaptive machines that terminate secured networks.

The basic-software integrator configures modules and drivers. The OEM decides which PDUs are secured, how freshness stays aligned, and how keys enter the vehicle in production and service. The silicon vendor sets what the driver can really do: slot count, algorithms, and boot-time checks.

What it covers

Topic What is specified
SecOC Secured PDU layout, authenticator build and check, freshness, truncation, interfaces to the communication stack
Classic crypto Csm jobs, Crypto Interface routing, Crypto Drivers for software or hardware
Keys and certificates Storage, update, and certificate handling shared across ECU functions
Secure hardware SHE-style slots, authenticated key updates, and boot MAC checks via the driver
Adaptive crypto ara::crypto providers and key storage
Security events Intrusion-detection modules that collect events such as failed authentication

The specifications define behavior and configuration. The project still chooses the key hierarchy, the algorithms, and which messages are worth the extra payload.

How it fits with other documents

SecOC is one client of the crypto stack. Secure boot, software-update checks, and certificate handling for diagnostics or a backend use the same jobs and the same key storage. Intrusion-detection modules distribute security events; the accept-or-drop decision stays in SecOC.

The PDU router and the underlying bus or Ethernet stack transport the frame. SecOC places freshness and the authenticator in the PDU. Functional-safety work still starts from hazards and safety goals. Where a goal depends on signal integrity, a passed authenticator check is one piece of evidence in that argument. ISO/SAE 21434 and UN Regulation No. 155 expect a managed cybersecurity process and reasoned controls, and they leave Csm jobs and the secured PDU layout to these AUTOSAR specifications.

In practice

Configure keys and jobs before SecOC references them. Choose freshness per message group, including how both ends resynchronize after reset or bus recovery. Leave room in the frame for freshness and the authenticator. Truncation saves bytes and still has to fit the threat you are closing.

Keep application code and boot firmware on Csm or ara::crypto, with the vendor secure-element interface inside the driver. Authenticated key updates and lockable slots make provisioning a plant and workshop process. A wrong key is a logistics problem for the plant or the workshop.

Define what the receiver does on a failed check: drop the PDU, hold the last good value, or raise a fault, and test that path. Report failures to intrusion detection without retry storms on the bus. When the frame map changes, review each secured PDU, because a signal moved into it inherits that PDU key and freshness.

What it means for your discipline

  • CybersecurityCore

    You decide which PDUs are authenticated, how freshness stays in step, which keys and algorithms each crypto job uses, and what a failed check means in the vehicle. Day to day you configure SecOC and the crypto stack from the threat analysis and collect evidence that forgery and replay of those messages are handled.

  • Base softwareCore

    You integrate Csm, the Crypto Interface, Crypto Drivers, key management, and SecOC on Classic platforms, or ara::crypto on Adaptive. Day to day you map jobs onto the secure element, configure secured PDUs, and bring the stack up together with boot and communication.

  • Networks & communicationCore

    SecOC adds freshness and an authenticator to secured PDUs, which takes payload and processing time on the bus or on Ethernet. You own the frame layout and the timing check so the secured PDU still fits the network design.

  • Hardware & siliconPartial

    The Crypto Driver is the software view of the secure element or crypto library on your microcontroller. You provide protected key slots, algorithm support, and boot MAC behavior the jobs expect, and you record silicon limits the integrator cannot configure away.

  • HPC & application softwarePartial

    Feature code requests MAC, hash, and verify operations through Csm or ara::crypto and reacts when a PDU is rejected. The vendor secure-element interface stays in the driver, so application logic follows the configured job.

  • E/E architecturePartial

    You place key storage and SecOC in the E/E architecture: on each ECU, at a zone controller, or on a high-performance computer. That placement decides which platform API applies and which networks carry secured PDUs.

  • Functional safetyPartial

    Where a safety goal relies on signal integrity, SecOC can be one measure in the safety concept, including the reaction when authentication fails. Hazard analysis and the safety case stay separate work from the crypto module specifications.

  • Diagnostics & lifecyclePartial

    Secure diagnostic access and certificate checks reuse the key storage and crypto jobs in this stack. Workshop flows have to match the keys and provisioning used for SecOC, or a healthy ECU will refuse the tester.

  • Software update & OTAPartial

    Secure boot and package verification call the same class of crypto jobs and protected keys. The update path has to succeed with keys the secure element will accept, including the boot check that runs before the application starts.