Contents
RegulationUNECE

UN R155

Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to cyber security and cyber security management system

UN R155 requires vehicle manufacturers to manage cybersecurity throughout the vehicle lifecycle and demonstrate that each vehicle type is protected against cyber threats.

What it is

UN R155 is a vehicle type-approval regulation with two linked requirements: a certified Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) and cybersecurity evidence for the vehicle type. The CSMS establishes organizational processes; vehicle approval examines their application to a particular design. A CSMS certificate alone does not approve every vehicle.

Who it applies to

The vehicle manufacturer holds responsibility for approval. Suppliers contribute information and evidence through the manufacturer’s supply chain. Approval authorities and technical services assess compliance.

The regulation’s scope includes vehicle categories L, M, N and O when fitted with an electronic control unit. These broadly cover powered two- and three-wheelers and quadricycles, passenger vehicles, goods vehicles and trailers. Local legislation determines which categories and approval routes are mandatory in a particular market; engineers should establish applicability for their project.

What it covers

The CSMS covers development, production and post-production. Vehicle evidence includes risk assessment, implemented mitigations and testing. Annex 5 identifies threats and corresponding mitigations to consider, including risks involving communications, software, external connections and supporting infrastructure. Detection, response and forensic information also form part of the requirements. These obligations are described in the published regulation.

For engineering work, translate those obligations into questions that have owners and reviewable answers:

Engineering question Useful project evidence
How could an attacker reach a sensitive function? Interface inventory and attack-path analysis
Why is the chosen protection sufficient? Risk rationale and security requirements
Does the protection work? Verification results and resolved findings
Who acts when a weakness appears in service? Response responsibilities and an exercised workflow

How it fits with other documents

Use ISO/SAE 21434 as an engineering framework for organizing cybersecurity activities and evidence. Keep a mapping from its work products to the applicable UN R155 requirements; a standards-based process should not be treated as automatic regulatory approval.

Coordinate with UN R156 for software-update management. For example, an update campaign may need both evidence of secure delivery and evidence that the update process meets its separate approval obligations.

Implementation specifications sit below these management and approval requirements. AUTOSAR SecOC, secure boot, authenticated diagnostics, network filtering and Uptane can contribute to a security design. Select them against assessed attack paths and system constraints rather than treating a technology list as proof of compliance.

In practice

Start with a vehicle boundary diagram and an inventory of interfaces, connected services and supplier responsibilities. Build a traceable chain from each assessed risk to a requirement, implementation decision and verification result.

For example, consider a diagnostic operation that can change ECU software. Review who can invoke it, how authorization is established, how credentials are protected and what happens after repeated failed attempts. Test the complete access path, including gateways and service tools.

Agree early on what suppliers must deliver and who reviews it. Before release, walk through a realistic field vulnerability: identify affected vehicles, assign investigation ownership, evaluate corrective action and retain the decision evidence. This turns the approval dossier into a working engineering record.

What it means for your discipline

  • CybersecurityCore

    Own the CSMS, vehicle risk assessment and cybersecurity approval evidence. Coordinate supplier assurance, security testing and response to vulnerabilities in service.

  • E/E architecturePartial

    Document trust boundaries, external interfaces and security dependencies. Explain how architectural protections address the vehicle's assessed threats.

  • Functional safetyPartial

    Coordinate with cybersecurity engineers when attacks could affect safety-related functions. Review whether security controls or incident responses introduce safety concerns.

  • Base softwarePartial

    Implement and verify platform protections such as secure boot, protected key storage and authenticated communication where required by the security design.

  • HPC & application softwarePartial

    Maintain evidence that software security requirements are implemented and tested. Support vulnerability analysis and corrective changes throughout the supported lifecycle.

  • Hardware & siliconPartial

    Provide hardware protections needed by the security design, including protected secrets and controlled debug access. Document assumptions and limitations for the vehicle risk assessment.

  • Networks & communicationPartial

    Design and test filtering, segmentation and communication protections against assessed attack paths. Supply evidence that external interfaces cannot bypass intended controls.

  • Diagnostics & lifecyclePartial

    Define and verify authorized diagnostic access, including workshop and remote access paths. Ensure service functions do not undermine vehicle cybersecurity controls.

  • Software update & OTAPartial

    Address cybersecurity risks in update delivery, infrastructure and installation. Coordinate update evidence with the separate UN R156 approval requirements.