Contents
StandardIETF

RFC 9325

Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)

RFC 9325 explains how to configure TLS and DTLS so that encrypted connections also provide dependable authentication and protection against known attacks.

What it is

RFC 9325 is IETF guidance for securely implementing and deploying Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). TLS protects connections commonly carried over TCP; DTLS provides similar protection for datagram communication.

It is a Best Current Practice document: it helps engineers choose and configure protocol features. It does not define a new encryption protocol. Its recommendations address the gap between having a TLS library and operating a secure service.

Who it applies to

The document addresses developers, integrators and operators of systems using TLS or DTLS. For automotive projects, relevant examples include vehicle connections to cloud services, charging-related services, engineering tools and IP-based ECU services where these protocols are selected.

An OEM can use it to establish a secure-channel baseline, while suppliers implement and demonstrate the agreed configuration. Backend teams must participate because both ends need compatible settings and appropriate authentication.

RFC 9325 is not an automotive regulation or a vehicle approval scheme. Its requirements can become project obligations through contracts, security specifications or references from other documents.

What it covers

The guidance addresses protocol versions, cryptographic choices, authentication and features that can introduce security weaknesses when configured incorrectly.

Topic Engineering meaning
Protocol versions Exclude obsolete versions and plan migration toward TLS 1.3.
Cryptographic configuration Select suitable cipher suites, key exchange and key parameters.
Peer authentication Validate credentials and check the intended service identity.
Connection features Review resumption, renegotiation, protocol selection and early data.

For example, TLS 1.3 early data can be replayed, so an application must consider whether repeating an operation is safe. Encryption alone also does not establish that the peer is the intended service. The recommendations and their rationale are documented in RFC 9325.

How it fits with other documents

RFC 8446 specifies TLS 1.3, and RFC 9147 specifies DTLS 1.3. RFC 9325 supplies deployment guidance alongside the underlying protocol specifications. It replaces RFC 7525 and should be read with its subsequent updates and errata.

In an automotive security workflow, it can support technical decisions made through ISO/SAE 21434 activities. It does not replace threat analysis, credential lifecycle design or application-specific requirements. Likewise, a protected download connection does not replace verification of an update package before installation.

In practice

Create a connection inventory showing each client, server, authentication direction and TLS termination point. Use it to agree a configuration profile across the vehicle platform, application and backend teams.

Turn that profile into observable acceptance criteria. Test rejected protocol versions, untrusted certificates, incorrect service identities and negotiation failures, alongside successful connections. Include production-representative credentials and platform settings in integration testing.

For a vehicle-to-cloud service, define how the vehicle recognizes the backend and whether the backend also authenticates the vehicle. Assign ownership for credential provisioning, renewal and failure recovery. Record supplier exceptions with their justification, and review the baseline as libraries and IETF guidance change.

What it means for your discipline

  • CybersecurityCore

    Own the secure-channel configuration baseline and assess exceptions. Translate the recommendations into requirements for authentication, cryptographic choices and verification.

  • HPC & application softwareCore

    Configure TLS libraries and implement peer verification, connection handling and secure defaults. Test that applications reject insecure connections.

  • Base softwarePartial

    Check whether the platform TLS integration supports the required versions, algorithms and credential interfaces. Ensure configuration remains consistent across ECU variants.

  • E/E architecturePartial

    Define where secure channels terminate and which endpoints authenticate each other. Account for gateways and backend intermediaries when drawing trust boundaries.

  • Networks & communicationPartial

    Understand how TLS and DTLS affect connection establishment and interoperability. Diagnose negotiation failures without weakening the approved security configuration.

  • Diagnostics & lifecyclePartial

    Apply the baseline when diagnostic services use TLS or DTLS. Keep transport authentication distinct from authorization to perform diagnostic operations.

  • Software update & OTAPartial

    Apply secure-channel requirements to update downloads and backend connections. Keep package authenticity and installation authorization as separate controls.

No direct stake: Functional safety · Hardware & silicon