Contents
StandardNIST

FIPS 204 (ML-DSA)

Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard

FIPS 204 is NIST's standard for ML-DSA, a post-quantum digital signature used to show that software, a certificate, or another message was signed by a trusted private key and has not been altered.

What it is

FIPS 204 is NIST’s Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. It specifies ML-DSA, the signature scheme derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium, so a signature can stay trustworthy against an attacker with a large quantum computer.

On a vehicle, ML-DSA is a post-quantum option for secure boot, code signing, and software-update packages. It speaks to authenticity and integrity of an artifact. Payload encryption, and message-authentication codes on CAN or Automotive Ethernet, are separate mechanisms.

The standard defines three parameter sets, ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87, at increasing security strength. A higher set means larger keys, larger signatures, and more computation. FIPS 204 also specifies key generation, signing, verification, and the encodings that let independent implementations interoperate.

Who it applies to

FIPS 204 is a United States federal information-processing standard. Federal information systems look to it when they adopt ML-DSA for digital signatures. Vehicle type approval is governed by other regulations.

It becomes a delivery requirement when a customer policy, a government-fleet contract, or the OEM crypto standard names it. Teams that own the boot chain should read it earlier: a verifier in ROM is difficult to replace after production. Cybersecurity chooses the parameter set. Other teams then live with the size, runtime, and hardware-security-module impact.

What it covers

FIPS 204 specifies ML-DSA key-pair generation, signing, and verification for each approved parameter set, plus the byte encodings required for interoperability. The caller supplies the message bytes. The vehicle program chooses which images, packages, or tokens are signed, along with certificates, boot order, key injection, and campaign rules.

Public keys and signatures are much larger than ECDSA or EdDSA: on the order of kilobytes, where elliptic-curve signatures are tens of bytes. That difference appears in the flash map, the download size, and RAM at verification. A backend or factory tool signs; every ECU in the field must be able to verify.

Topic Specified by FIPS 204 Left to the vehicle program
Operations Key generation, sign, verify, encodings Boot ROM, hardware security module, or host software
Parameter sets ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 Which set applies to each artifact
Signed input Message bytes from the caller Images, certificates, diagnostic tokens
Migration The ML-DSA algorithm Dual signatures and trust-anchor updates

How it fits with other documents

FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM, a key-establishment mechanism. FIPS 205 specifies SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature with a different size and speed. ML-KEM agrees a shared secret; ML-DSA signs an artifact. SLH-DSA is the hash-based alternative.

Elliptic-curve signatures, including those in FIPS 186, remain the common choice on vehicles today. LMS and XMSS, specified in NIST SP 800-208, are stateful hash-based signatures already used by some firmware signers; the signer must track one-time state. ML-DSA is stateless.

ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE UN Regulation No. 155 require cybersecurity engineering. UN Regulation No. 156 requires a managed software-update process. Those regulations cover process and risk treatment and leave the signature algorithm to the security concept. An AUTOSAR crypto stack can expose a verify job to the bootloader when the release and the hardware-security-module firmware support the algorithm.

In practice

Name the artifacts that must still verify for the life of the ECU: bootloader, application, calibration, and the update package. For each, record the signer, the trust anchor in ROM or one-time-programmable memory, and the flash allowed for the public key and signature.

Time verification on the production microcontroller and hardware security module before freezing the parameter set. ML-DSA-44 is the smallest approved set. ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 raise the security category along with size and runtime. Keep signing keys in the backend or factory signer.

Give the image header an algorithm identifier and room for a second signature so classical and ML-DSA signatures can ship together. Integrate a maintained library and run its known-answer tests. If a contract cites FIPS 204, record the edition, the parameter set, the artifact list, and any hybrid-signature rule, and check the current edition for errata before the baseline is frozen.

What it means for your discipline

  • CybersecurityCore

    You choose ML-DSA in the security concept and name the parameter set for each long-lived asset. FIPS 204 is the specification you cite for key generation, signing, verification, and interoperable encodings.

  • Software update & OTACore

    You sign update packages and manifests in the backend and depend on verifiers that stay in the field for years. ML-DSA changes package size, the signing service, and the need for an algorithm identifier so classical and post-quantum signatures can coexist.

  • E/E architecturePartial

    You decide which ECUs hold trust anchors and verify boot images or update packages. The larger ML-DSA keys and signatures have to fit those ECUs' memory maps and the download budget.

  • Base softwarePartial

    You expose verification through the crypto stack and the hardware-security-module job the bootloader calls. Daily work is the algorithm identifier, buffer sizes for the public key and signature, and a library or firmware build that passes known-answer tests.

  • HPC & application softwarePartial

    Boot and application code call verify and reserve header space for the signature and trust anchor. Keep the lattice math inside the crypto library and treat the signature as a versioned blob in the image format.

  • Hardware & siliconPartial

    You size flash, RAM, and the secure element so the chosen parameter set meets the boot-time limit. Confirm early whether the hardware security module can store the public key and run ML-DSA verify, or whether the host core must do it.

No direct stake: Functional safety · Networks & communication · Diagnostics & lifecycle